Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United States, 1947–2007

Uk Heo and John Bohte

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012, vol. 56, issue 3, 413-438

Abstract: Past studies on military expenditures in the United States have primarily focused on the extent to which guns versus butter trade-offs are prevalent without examining this relationship in the context of how other fiscal policy tools are used to pay for defense. Using annual data from 1947–2007, this study examines the relative importance of defense financing policy measures, such as guns versus butter trade-offs, tax increases, and deficit spending in paying for defense. The results show evidence of guns versus butter trade-off during the Reagan Era, but not during other periods. Both federal tax policy and deficit spending have played influential roles in funding defense spending during peacetime. This modeling strategy points to the importance of analyzing the effects of multiple fiscal policy tools when studying the forces that drive military spending in the United States since World War II.

Keywords: defense spending; fiscal policy; United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:413-438

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