Arms Diffusion and War

Muhammet Bas and Andrew J. Coe
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Andrew J. Coe: Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012, vol. 56, issue 4, 651-674

Abstract: The authors present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. The authors illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in precolonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere.

Keywords: preventive war; proliferation; bargaining models; nuclear weapons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:651-674

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