Misplaced Blame
Omar S. Bashir () and
Darren J. Lim
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Omar S. Bashir: Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Darren J. Lim: Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2013, vol. 57, issue 3, 509-523
Abstract:
In a well-publicized finding, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue that temporary members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) suffer politically and economically because they receive elevated inflows of foreign aid in exchange for votes. Closer examination of the data reveals a lack of support for this claim. Even when the analysis is limited to countries that do not enjoy temporarily increased aid during tenure, UNSC membership retains an association with poor outcomes that are disproportionately strong in nondemocratic countries, contrary to the expectation generated by selectorate theory. A separate least-likely test specification further weakens the case against foreign aid. The authors postulate and weigh alternative explanations. Temporary membership may enable deleterious state policy through a lessened fear of international sanction. Alternatively, the membership selection process may be biased in a way not currently recognized by scholars who employ UNSC election as a source of exogenous variation in the international system.
Keywords: international organizations; United Nations Security Council; economic growth; foreign aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:57:y:2013:i:3:p:509-523
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