Aid

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita () and Alastair Smith
Additional contact information
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: Department of Politics, New York University, New York City, NY, USA
Alastair Smith: Department of Politics, New York University, New York City, NY, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2013, vol. 57, issue 3, 524-537

Abstract: Temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has pernicious effects on the political and economic development of nations, particularly in nondemocracies. The leaders of rich democratic states often trade resources for the salient policy favors that UNSC members can deliver. This provides the leaders of temporary UNSC members with access to “easy money†resources. Such resources have deleterious consequences, particularly in nondemocracies, because they provide leaders with the means to pay off their coalition of supporters without reliance on tax revenues. While foreign aid is an important form of easy money bribe, it is but one of many. Empirical tests show loans are a substitute means for bribing UNSC members.

Keywords: foreign n aid; loans; resource curse; selectorate theory; United Nations Security Council; policy concessions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/57/3/524.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:57:y:2013:i:3:p:524-537

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().