Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution

Michael G. Findley ()
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Michael G. Findley: Department of Government, University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2013, vol. 57, issue 5, 905-932

Abstract: This article examines civil war resolution as a process comprised of multiple interdependent stages. It engages directly the idea that peace emerges only as a process comprised of battle, negotiation, agreement, and implementation of an agreement. I hypothesize that events at earlier stages of the peace process have implications for later stages, but not always in the same ways. Drawing on bargaining models of war, I consider how two factors that might prevent successful bargaining—stalemates and the number of actors—can encourage cooperation early in a peace process but impede lasting cooperation at later stages. Using a nested dichotomies statistical approach to capture interdependence, I find support for the argument that stalemates and the number of actors have different effects depending on the stage of the peace process. The results substantiate the need in theoretical and policy work to consider peace as an interdependent, sequential process.

Keywords: civil war; conflict management; conflict termination; bargaining; interdependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:57:y:2013:i:5:p:905-932

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