Information and Institutions Redux

Terrence L. Chapman () and Henry Pascoe
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Terrence L. Chapman: Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
Henry Pascoe: Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, vol. 59, issue 1, 161-172

Abstract: In “Information and Institutions Revisited,†Fey et al. point out some corrections to the equilibrium analyzed in Chapman. In this brief response, we argue that while these corrections are appropriate, they do not address the larger substantive question of when conditions exist that would facilitate information transmission between an international security organization and a domestic audience. We show an equilibrium in which the core logic of the information transmission argument in Chapman remains. We also discuss the particular modeling choices that facilitate information transmission (or prevent it) in equilibrium.

Keywords: international institutions; domestic politics; information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:59:y:2015:i:1:p:161-172

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