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False Negotiations

Edy Glozman, Netta Barak-Corren and Ilan Yaniv ()
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Edy Glozman: FBC & Co, Law Firm, Tel-Aviv, Israel
Netta Barak-Corren: Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA
Ilan Yaniv: Department of Psychology and Center for Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, vol. 59, issue 4, 671-697

Abstract: The usual purpose of negotiations is to explore options and reach an agreement, if possible. We investigated a notable exception to this generalization, where a party negotiates without any intention of reaching an agreement. False negotiation occurs when a party gains more by stalling the negotiations until an external change takes place that improves its position considerably. While false negotiators aim to avoid agreement within the current frame of the negotiations, they also aim to keep the negotiation process alive, since walking away from the negotiation table could endanger their position. We report the results of a study that compared the actions of false and sincere negotiators. The false negotiators used competitive tactics that encumbered the negotiations, yet they concealed their intentions by maintaining a facade of cooperation. Our theoretical discussion is focused on the balancing act involved in false negotiations and the challenges it poses for actors in social, managerial, and political settings. We conclude our analysis with an example from the realm of international negotiations.

Keywords: negotiations; deception; mixed motive; breakdown (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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