How Government Coordination Controlled Organized Crime

Viridiana Rios

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, vol. 59, issue 8, 1433-1454

Abstract: This article provides empirical evidence showing that when a multilevel government is well coordinated, organized crime can be more effectively controlled. Using a time-variant data set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the subnational level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, I show that when Mexico’s democratization decreased the probability of government coordination—the same party governing a municipality at every level of government—drug traffickers were more likely to violate the long-standing informal prohibition on selling cocaine within the country. It was this decrease in government coordination that would set the conditions for a violent war between drug cartels to erupt in the mid-2000s.

Keywords: democratic institutions; conflict; democratization; foreign policy; international institutions; international security; internal armed conflict; foreign policy decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:59:y:2015:i:8:p:1433-1454

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