National Responses to Transnational Terrorism

Thomas Jensen

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2016, vol. 60, issue 3, 530-554

Abstract: Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot.

Keywords: transnational terrorism; counterterrorism; intelligence; intelligence sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/60/3/530.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:60:y:2016:i:3:p:530-554

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().