Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data
Michael A. Bailey,
Anton Strezhnev and
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017, vol. 61, issue 2, 430-456
United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes have become the standard data source for measures of states preferences over foreign policy. Most papers use dyadic indicators of voting similarity between states. We propose a dynamic ordinal spatial model to estimate state ideal points from 1946 to 2012 on a single dimension that reflects state positions toward the US-led liberal order. We use information about the content of the UNâ€™s agenda to make estimates comparable across time. Compared to existing measures, our estimates better separate signal from noise in identifying foreign policy shifts, have greater face validity, allow for better intertemporal comparisons, are less sensitive to shifts in the UNâ€™ agenda, and are strongly correlated with measures of liberalism. We show that the choice of preference measures affects conclusions about the democratic peace.
Keywords: international cooperation; international law; international organization; international institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:61:y:2017:i:2:p:430-456
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