Domestic Signaling of Commitment Credibility

Michael C. Horowitz, Paul Poast and Allan Stam ()

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017, vol. 61, issue 8, 1682-1710

Abstract: We provide a new perspective on how domestic factors shape the prospects for international cooperation. Internal arms, specifically conscription, signal a willingness and suitability to be a dependable ally. Possessing ineffective military forces inhibits a state’s ability to assist prospective allies and renders a state less able to deter threats on its own. This exemplifies an instance where the trade-off between arms and allies does not apply. Using new data on the military recruitment policies of states since 1816, we find that adopting a conscription-based recruitment system in the previous five years makes a state more likely to form an alliance in the current year, even when accounting for a heightened threat environment.

Keywords: alliance; conflict; domestic politics; militarized interstate disputes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:61:y:2017:i:8:p:1682-1710

DOI: 10.1177/0022002715612576

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