Economics at your fingertips  

Concession Bargaining

Federica Alberti, Sven Fischer, Werner Güth and Kei Tsutsui

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2018, vol. 62, issue 9, 2017-2039

Abstract: We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol, no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differs across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.

Keywords: concession bargaining; dynamic interaction; emotions; deadline; conflict; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1177/0022002717720753

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

Page updated 2022-06-03
Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:62:y:2018:i:9:p:2017-2039