A Vote for Freedom? The Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions on Regime Type
Dov H. Levin
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2019, vol. 63, issue 4, 839-868
Abstract:
What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the subsequent character of the regime in the targeted country? Partisan electoral interventions have been frequently used by the great powers ever since the rise of meaningful competitive elections around the world. Such interventions have been found to have significant effects on the results of the intervened elections determining in many cases the identity of the winner. Nevertheless, there has been little research on the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the target’s subsequent level of democracy. This study investigates this question, testing three hypotheses derived from relevant political science literatures. I find suggestive evidence that covert electoral interventions have a significant negative effect on the target’s democracy increasing its susceptibility to a democratic breakdown. I also find preliminary evidence that the identity of the intervener has a mediating effect on the negative effects of covert interventions.
Keywords: foreign policy; intervention; covert/clandestine action; democratic institutions; democratization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:4:p:839-868
DOI: 10.1177/0022002718770507
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