Unraveling Secessions

Friedhelm Hentschel

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2019, vol. 63, issue 6, 1517-1541

Abstract: In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus, nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a secession is one instrument to eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs by implementing their own policy. However, leaving the country reduces economies of scale in the public good provision. Therefore, separatist ethnic groups face a trade-off between eliminating ethnic heterogeneity costs and losing economies of scale in the provision of public goods. I present a model for unraveling secessions in an ethnically segregated country. I use this model to derive conditions for the breakup of countries and to compare equilibrium behavior with and without the possibility of a consecutive secession. Among others, I find that a secessionist conflict will be more likely if there is a previous secession. Furthermore, aggregated conflict spending is larger in secessions with the possibility of a consecutive conflict.

Keywords: civil war; conflict; public good provision; secessions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:6:p:1517-1541

DOI: 10.1177/0022002718792611

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