The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Luke Abbs, Govinda Clayton and Andrew Thomson

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020, vol. 64, issue 5, 903-932

Abstract: Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.

Keywords: ethnicity; pro-government militia; counterinsurgency; civil war; conflict intensity; conflict duration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:64:y:2020:i:5:p:903-932

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719883684

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