Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers

Serhat Doğan, Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Hüseyin Çağrı Sağlam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Çağrı Sağlam and Emin Karagözoğlu

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023, vol. 67, issue 2-3, 210-234

Abstract: We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state between the aggressive players. We find various equilibrium outcomes, which can be grouped into the following categories: ( i ) peace with buffer, ( ii ) peace without buffer, and ( iii ) the last man standing. Our comparative static analyses reveal valuable insights regarding the factors affecting the existence of buffer states.

Keywords: buffer state; dynamic contest; international conflict; territorial conflict; warfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:2-3:p:210-234

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221114868

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