The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Asset Expropriation

Hoon Lee, David Lektzian and Glen Biglaiser

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023, vol. 67, issue 2-3, 266-296

Abstract: Studies suggest that home countries impose economic sanctions following host state expropriation of home firms. However, and not addressed in the empirical literature, is the possibility that sanctions lead targeted countries to nationalize firms from sender countries. Using bilateral expropriation data from 1985 to 2010, and controlling for endogeneity issues, we find that sanctions significantly increase expropriation risk, encouraging targeted states to inflict pain in a reciprocal manner on sender countries. Expropriations also enable targeted nations to acquire economic assets from foreign firms, undermining the restricting goals of sanctioning states, and provide opportunities for leaders to show political resolve at home by standing up to senders. Our results are robust using monadic or dyadic data and different statistical methods, indicating another sanction-busting strategy used by targeted countries.

Keywords: expropriation; economic sanctions; multinational corporations; sanction busting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027221118250 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:2-3:p:266-296

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221118250

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().