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Triangles, Major Powers, and Rivalry Duration

Bomi K. Lee

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023, vol. 67, issue 6, 1128-1154

Abstract: Why do some international rivalries last longer than others? Rivalry literature focuses on the dyadic interactions within rivalries, but most rivalries have been connected to other rivalries. This paper examines a rivalry’s overlapping immediate strategic environment focusing on the countries directly connected via rivalries or alliances. Specifically, I consider how rivals are connected to third parties as common enemies, common friends, or mixed. I focus on three mechanisms to explain the third parties’ influence on the focal rivalry. First, a rivalry is more likely to end when it has common allies (information flow) or common enemies (prioritization) . Second, a rivalry with mixed third parties is more likely to endure (stable blocs) . Analyses of rivalry duration show that the duration of minor-minor rivalries is more likely to be influenced by common allies and mixed third parties, while that of major-minor rivalries is more likely to be affected by common enemies.

Keywords: international rivalries; triangular relationships; network analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:6:p:1128-1154

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221134781

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