Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach

Even Hellan Larsen

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2024, vol. 68, issue 5, 849-874

Abstract: Most nuclear dyads are characterized by some degree of nuclear and conventional asymmetry. This paper argues that these asymmetries create an environment in which deliberate nuclear first use (DNFU) can be rational. This possibility has been discarded in the formal literature on nuclear escalation because of the common reliance on the assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This paper develops a formal model that traces how and under what circumstances two types of DNFU are rational. First, nuclear imbalances and advancements in counterforce technologies create a damage limitation incentive for a strong actor. Second, conventional asymmetry creates an incentive for the coercive use of nuclear weapons by the weaker player. Moreover, this paper illustrates that these asymmetric conditions are a relevant characteristic in important and very different nuclear dyads: DPRK–US, Pakistan–India, and Russia–US. Thus, the model demonstrates the potential core drivers of DNFU in today’s nuclear landscape.

Keywords: game theory; nuclear weapons; war; use of force; international security; asymmetric conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:5:p:849-874

DOI: 10.1177/00220027231185154

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