China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival

Patrick E. Shea, Bernhard Reinsberg and Andreas Kern

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025, vol. 69, issue 4, 571-598

Abstract: What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power for longer periods. To support this argument, we conducted an analysis of a dataset of 115 developing countries from 2000 to 2015, focusing on the relationship between Chinese loans and leaders' political survival. Our findings indicate that Chinese loans positively impact leader survival, with the strongest effects observed in more corrupt regimes. To address endogeneity concerns, we employ a shift-share instrumentation strategy and several additional tests. Our analysis underscores the importance of Chinese lending to both international and domestic politics.

Keywords: China; debt; political leadership; tenure; political economy; political science; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:69:y:2025:i:4:p:571-598

DOI: 10.1177/00220027241263036

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