Is China-Taiwan Rapprochement Possible? Experimental Evidence From Taiwan

Hsin-Hsin Pan, Scott L. Kastner and Margaret M. Pearson

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025, vol. 69, issue 7-8, 1143-1171

Abstract: Any peaceful resolution to the Cross-Strait conflict between China and Taiwan is likely to be composed of give-and-take between the two sides, and any agreement will ultimately require the support of Taiwan’s citizens, by whom Taiwan’s leaders are held accountable. Yet little is known about the actual tradeoffs Taiwanese citizens are willing to make in pursuit of an agreement in a time of peace. In conjoint experiments fielded in Taiwan in April 2022, we present Taiwanese respondents with hypothetical Cross-Strait agreements that randomly assign economic, security, and sovereignty-related concessions by the two sides. We find that support for agreements is conditioned by the concessions included, with sovereignty-related or security-related concessions by Taiwan lowering support, and sovereignty or security-related concessions by China increasing support. Additionally, respondents indicate that neither US support nor PRC threats significantly influence support for agreements, and that Taiwan's acceptance of an agreement substantially reduces the perceived likelihood of conflict.

Keywords: Taiwan; China; US; cross-strait agreement; public opinion; conjoint experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:69:y:2025:i:7-8:p:1143-1171

DOI: 10.1177/00220027241300045

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