Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited

Joseph Price, Brian Soebbing, David Berri and Brad Humphreys
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Joseph Price: Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
David Berri: Southern Utah University, Cedar City, UT, USA

Journal of Sports Economics, 2010, vol. 11, issue 2, 117-135

Abstract: Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.

Keywords: tanking; NBA; tournament theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:11:y:2010:i:2:p:117-135

DOI: 10.1177/1527002510363103

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