The Effect of Incentives on Sabotage: The Case of Spanish Football

Julio del Corral, Juan Prieto-Rodríguez and Rob Simmons
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Juan Prieto-Rodríguez: University of Oviedo-Fundación Observatorio, Económico del Deporte
Rob Simmons: Lancaster University Management School
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan Prieto-Rodriguez ()

Journal of Sports Economics, 2010, vol. 11, issue 3, 243-260

Abstract: A growing literature examines adverse behavior as unintended consequences of incentives. We test Lazear’s hypothesis that states that if rewards were dependent solely on relative performance then an increase in rewards would induce agents to engage in sabotage activity to reduce rivals’ output. We test this hypothesis using the natural experiment of a rule change in Spanish football, the increase in points for winning a league match from two to three. We find, consistent with Lazear’s hypothesis, that teams in a winning position were more likely to commit offences punishable by dismissal of a player after this change.

Keywords: incentives; sabotage; rules; red cards; football (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: The Effect of Incentives on Sabotage: The Case of Spanish Football (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:11:y:2010:i:3:p:243-260

DOI: 10.1177/1527002509340666

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