Optimal Competitive Balance in Single-Game Ticket Sports Leagues

Rodney Fort and James Quirk
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Rodney Fort: Sport Management, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, rodfort@umich.edu
James Quirk: Division of Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology (Retired), Pasadena, USA

Journal of Sports Economics, 2010, vol. 11, issue 6, 587-601

Abstract: The authors extend the theory of optimal competitive balance to leagues where single-game ticket sales dominate revenues. Whether a planner that maximizes the sum of fan and owner surpluses prefers more balance or less in such a league depends on the relative magnitude of marginal consumers’ surpluses with respect to talent in larger and smaller revenue markets. This relationship is much more complex than previous cases in the literature. Ultimately, then, the determination of whether more balance is preferred to less in any particular sports league requires careful and thorough empirical investigation.

Keywords: Sports Leagues; Competitive Balance; Optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:11:y:2010:i:6:p:587-601

DOI: 10.1177/1527002509359906

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