A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents

John Solow and Anthony Krautmann

Journal of Sports Economics, 2011, vol. 12, issue 3, 309-316

Abstract: In this paper, we focus on how rents are divided between an elite free agent and a team in a Nash bargaining framework. In order to find the Nash bargaining solution, we identify the threat points of the player and the team as the best alternative bargains that the player and the team could reach with another team and another player, respectively. We then extend the analysis to include a consideration of multiple teams potentially bidding for the free agent’s services. In this section of the paper, we show that the player’s ultimate location and salary are determined by his marginal value over his replacement.

Keywords: nash bargaining; free agents; salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002511404781 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:309-316

DOI: 10.1177/1527002511404781

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().