Do Relief Pitching and Remaining Games Create Moral Hazard Problems in Major League Baseball?

Kevin Baldini, Mark T. Gillis and Matt E. Ryan

Journal of Sports Economics, 2011, vol. 12, issue 6, 647-659

Abstract: Previous research neglects to consider additional sources of moral hazard in baseball beyond the designated hitter (DH) rule. Using a game-level analysis similar to Bradbury and Drinen (2006) , the authors find that an additional National League (NL) relief pitcher leads to more hit batsmen than an additional American League (AL) relief pitcher and that the number of games remaining in the NL has a smaller positive effect on the number of hit batsmen than the number of games remaining in the AL, though the latter relationship is economically small. Both results, however, imply additional avenues by which moral hazard emerges.

Keywords: moral hazard; baseball; relief pitching; games remaining; designated hitter; retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:12:y:2011:i:6:p:647-659

DOI: 10.1177/1527002510388149

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