Contests With Doping

Dmitry Ryvkin

Journal of Sports Economics, 2013, vol. 14, issue 3, 253-275

Abstract: Doping, or the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs, is an epidemic problem in sports ranging from the Olympics to high school athletics. This article presents a theoretical model of doping use in a contest environment. The authors show that, under fairly general conditions, the minimal frequency of random testing to prevent doping use increases in the number of contestants. The presence of even a small penalty, in addition to expulsion from the contest, makes random testing more effective, especially in large contests. For a given testing frequency, the minimal penalty to prevent doping can be nonmonotonic in the number of contestants.

Keywords: doping; contest; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Contests with doping (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:14:y:2013:i:3:p:253-275

DOI: 10.1177/1527002511427320

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