Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence From the Reform of Figure Skating Judging
Journal of Sports Economics, 2014, vol. 15, issue 1, 3-30
Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union (ISU) introduced a number of changes to its judging system, including obscuring which judge issued which mark. The stated intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges, but this change also frustrates most attempts by outsiders to monitor judge behavior. The author finds that the â€œcompatriot-judge effect,â€ which aggregates favoritism (nationalistic bias from own-country judges) and corruption (vote trading), actually increased slightly after the reforms.
Keywords: transparency; corruption; collusion; bias; vote trading; nationalism; judging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:15:y:2014:i:1:p:3-30
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().