Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Sports Contests

Martin Grossmann

Journal of Sports Economics, 2015, vol. 16, issue 1, 108-121

Abstract: Most articles on sports economics presume the well-known Nash equilibrium concept. In this article, however, we apply evolutionary game theory in a sports-contest model. If clubs follow evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), then ESS generate greater investments and smaller profits than predicted by Nash’s strategies, independent of whether a club is win-maximizing or profit-maximizing. Overdissipation of the rent is possible for Nash strategies and for ESS.

Keywords: contest; evolutionary stable strategies; utility maximization; team sports league (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Sports Contests (2011)
Working Paper: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Sports Contests (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:16:y:2015:i:1:p:108-121

DOI: 10.1177/1527002512470957

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