Combinatorial Auctions for Player Selection in the Indian Premier League (IPL)

Soumyakanti Chakraborty, Anup K. Sen and Amitava Bagchi

Journal of Sports Economics, 2015, vol. 16, issue 1, 86-107

Abstract: In 2008, the benefits of team formation by auction first became apparent in the field of professional cricket. The Indian Premier League organized sequential single-item auctions to allocate 77 cricketers to eight teams that participated in a Twenty20 cricket tournament. We argue in this article that the auction format used resulted in distortion of player valuations. We recommend a combinatorial auction scheme MRPF which enables bidders to exploit the complementary nature of the resources. A laboratory experiment undertaken to test the feasibility of MRPF indicated that it would result in a more efficient auction system.

Keywords: combinatorial auctions; multiround auction; cricket; Indian Premier League (IPL); information feedback (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:16:y:2015:i:1:p:86-107

DOI: 10.1177/1527002512470141

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