Inefficiencies in the National Hockey League Points System and the Teams That Take Advantage

Michael J. Lopez

Journal of Sports Economics, 2015, vol. 16, issue 4, 410-424

Abstract: In the current National Hockey League (NHL) points system (PS), there are increased incentives for teams to play overtime games against nonconference opponents. We use empirical data across three recent NHL PSs to test if and when teams have responded to these incentives. We find that in the current PS, several teams are playing a significantly higher proportion of overtime games against nonconference opponents than within-conference ones, and that overtime games are also significantly more likely to occur in the months leading up to postseason play.

Keywords: National Hockey League; overtime; incentives; scoring systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:16:y:2015:i:4:p:410-424

DOI: 10.1177/1527002513486654

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