Cheating in Contests

Vijay Mohan and Bharat Hazari

Journal of Sports Economics, 2016, vol. 17, issue 7, 736-747

Abstract: We examine the impact of regulation on the doping decisions of athletes in a Tullock contest. The regulatory measures we consider are greater monitoring by sports authorities and a lowering of the prize in the contest. When legal efforts and illegal drugs are substitutes, an increase in anti-doping regulation may, counterintuitively, increase the levels of doping activity by athletes. Anti-doping regulation can also have the undesirable consequence of decreasing legal efforts; in our model, this always occurs when legal efforts and illegal drugs are complements, and under certain circumstances when they are substitutes.

Keywords: doping; anti-doping regulation; Tullock contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:17:y:2016:i:7:p:736-747

DOI: 10.1177/1527002514542438

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