Winning by Losing
Dmitry Dagaev () and
Konstantin Sonin ()
Journal of Sports Economics, 2018, vol. 19, issue 8, 1122-1146
In sport tournaments, the rules are presumably structured in a way that any participant cannot benefit by losing instead of winning. We show that tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes, which are ubiquitous around the world, are generically incentive incompatible. We use our model to discuss potential remedies and applications.
Keywords: tournaments; design; rules; incentives; football (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:19:y:2018:i:8:p:1122-1146
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