The Rewards to Running

James G. Lynch and Jeffrey Zax ()
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James G. Lynch: U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration

Journal of Sports Economics, 2000, vol. 1, issue 4, 323-340

Abstract: This article explicitly compares the incentive and sorting theories of tournament performance in road races. Regressions omitting controls for runner ability suggest that runners record faster times the greater the loss they would suffer from finishing below their prerace ranking. However, the relationship between prize money at risk and finishing time weakens or vanishes with these controls. These results strongly suggest that races with large prizes record faster times because they attract faster runners, not because they encourage all runners to run faster.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:1:y:2000:i:4:p:323-340

DOI: 10.1177/152700250000100401

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