Optimal Team Contests to Induce More Efforts

Dongryul Lee and Joon Song

Journal of Sports Economics, 2019, vol. 20, issue 3, 448-476

Abstract: We show that, if the team sports designer puts more weight on the performance of high-ability members (e.g., star players) than on low-ability members, the designer encourages the low-ability member to free ride on the high-ability members so that the high-ability members exert even greater efforts. Thus, the designer’s choice approximates the best shot team contest. With more weight on the low-ability member’s performance, the choice approximates the weakest link team contest to undermine the free riding. The approximations work better with more convex effort cost function and/or smaller heterogeneity of group members.

Keywords: group contest; team sports; contest design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:20:y:2019:i:3:p:448-476

DOI: 10.1177/1527002518771443

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