Race and National Football League Player Salaries After Controlling for Fantasy Statistics and Arrests
Christopher Jepsen (),
Lisa Jepsen (),
Trevor Draisey and
Journal of Sports Economics, 2021, vol. 22, issue 4, 359-386
This paper provides a novel contribution to studies of race and labor-market outcomes by using fantasy football statistics as a measure of performance across offensive skill positions and arrest data as a proxy for negative off-the-field behavior. We investigate whether the determinants of salaries and employment vary between 2005-06 and 2015-16, as the 2011 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) introduced extensive regulation of rookie contracts. As expected, fantasy football statistics are strong predictors of salaries and employment in both time periods, whereas race and arrests are not. Fantasy statistics and experience have diminishing marginal returns for both outcomes.
Keywords: productivity; discrimination; salary; National Football League; compensation; Collective Bargaining Agreement; quantile regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:22:y:2021:i:4:p:359-386
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