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Did the 2011 Change to NFL Rookie Compensation Alter How Sunk Costs Affect Utilization?

Quinn Andrew Wesley Keefer

Journal of Sports Economics, 2021, vol. 22, issue 4, 387-411

Abstract: The 2011 NFL collective bargaining agreement introduced significant changes to rookie compensation, including a rookie wage scale. We test if the new rules changed how sunk costs affect utilization for drafted rookies. Our regression discontinuity results show a robust sunk-cost fallacy that is similar in magnitude to the one documented under the previous agreement. Second-round selections play significantly less than their first-round counterparts, as measured by percentage of games started, total snaps played, and percentage of snaps played. However, the effect is not evident beyond the rookie season. Additional results show coaching success and coaching changes are important factors.

Keywords: sunk costs; NFL; NFL draft; NFL collective bargaining agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1527002520983434

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:22:y:2021:i:4:p:387-411