Corruption and Self-Sabotage in Sporting Competitions – An Experimental Approach to Match-Fixing Behavior and the Influence of Deterrence Factors

Thomas Giel, Sören Dallmeyer, Daniel Memmert and Christoph Breuer

Journal of Sports Economics, 2023, vol. 24, issue 4, 497-525

Abstract: This study investigates match-fixing employing a 2-player contest in an experimental setting. Subjects compete in a real-effort task and are bribed onetime to self-sabotage. Based on Becker’s deterrence hypothesis, the effectiveness of deterrent factors is analyzed via different treatments applying an expected utility framework. Results show that the majority of participants do not maximize their monetary payoff, that increasing detection probability has a higher deterring effect on bribe acceptance compared to severity of monetary punishment, and that participants with lower performance levels were more likely to accept bribes. Implications are derived for sport governing bodies to operate against match-fixing.

Keywords: integrity; contest; underperformance; bribery; deterrence hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:24:y:2023:i:4:p:497-525

DOI: 10.1177/15270025221134239

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