Optimal Timeout Choices in Clutch Situations in the NBA

Michael Allgrunn, Christopher Douglas and Sebastian Wai

Journal of Sports Economics, 2024, vol. 25, issue 2, 217-230

Abstract: When down by a possession in fourth quarter with the shot clock off and possessing the ball, National Basketball Association (NBA) coaches face a decision: take a timeout and draw up a play or let play continue. Utilizing play-by-play data for 16,839 NBA games, we find taking a timeout lowers a team's chances of a successful possession by 5.7 percentage points. Coaches might view taking a timeout as the safe decision, since blame for the loss would fall on the players for not executing the play, not on the coach for failing to call one. This suboptimal behavior suggests there is a principal–agent problem between team owners and coaches.

Keywords: National Basketball Association; timeout; principal–agent problem; coaching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:25:y:2024:i:2:p:217-230

DOI: 10.1177/15270025231217961

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