An Economic Approach to Sports Injury Policies

Jeffrey Cisyk and Pascal Courty

Journal of Sports Economics, 2024, vol. 25, issue 3, 388-419

Abstract: We propose an analysis of sports injury policies founded on the assertion that injuries are due to both uncontrollable risks (accidents from participating in sports) and controllable risks (athlete's deliberate choices in risk-taking). We compare the adoption decision of an injury policy made by: (a) a sport's organizer who maximizes welfare, (b) a sport's organizer who fails to account for athletes’ behavioral risk responses, and (c) the athletes themselves. We argue that policies that escalate risk, such as mandatory protective equipment, are over-adopted by the naïve sport organizer and the athletes, while policies that de-escalate risk, such as return-to-play rules, are under-adopted.

Keywords: sports injury; injury intervention; injury policy; risk-taking; protection equipment; return-to-play; safe play; treatment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 Z28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: An economic approach to sports injury policies (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:25:y:2024:i:3:p:388-419

DOI: 10.1177/15270025231222635

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