The Impact of Pool Sharing on the Distribution of Playing Talent in the N-Team Leagues

Masaki Fujimoto

Journal of Sports Economics, 2025, vol. 26, issue 7, 816-841

Abstract: This article exactly determines the impact of pool sharing on the talent distribution in the league for a general n –team model where each team is a profit maximizer, each team has the Nash conjectures, each team's revenue depends only on relative team qualities, and the supply of talent is fixed. It is shown that when a pool-sharing agreement is introduced, larger-market teams with greater marginal revenues of winning before sharing will demand more wins and talents than before sharing, while smaller-market teams with smaller marginal revenues of winning before sharing will demand less wins and talents than before sharing.

Keywords: Sports leagues; competitive balance; pool sharing; marginal revenue of winning; economic value of a win (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:26:y:2025:i:7:p:816-841

DOI: 10.1177/15270025251348166

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