The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution

J. Richard Hill and Peter Groothuis
Additional contact information
J. Richard Hill: Central Michigan University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2001, vol. 2, issue 2, 131-144

Abstract: In this article, it is suggested that the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the National Basketball Association (NBA) redistributes rents from the superstars back to the median voters. In particular, it is suggested that portions of the new agreement, such as salary caps, are designed to improve the rather skewed distribution of salaries in the NBA. Evidence from a Lorenz curve analysis of the first 2 years under the new contract suggests that all players with salaries below the median wage gain from the new agreement, and those with salaries closest to the median wage gain the most. The analysis suggests that skewed salary distributions may lead to CBAs that redistribute the rents from the rich (superstars) to the poor (median voters).

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/152700250100200203 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:131-144

DOI: 10.1177/152700250100200203

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().