Credibility and Independence of the World Anti-Doping Agency

Nicolas Eber

Journal of Sports Economics, 2002, vol. 3, issue 1, 90-96

Abstract: This article argues that the antidoping policy faces a credibility problem very similar to that identified for the conduct of the monetary policy. Using a theoretical framework à la Barro-Gordon in which athletes form rational expectations about authorities’ effort against doping, the author shows that strong antidoping policies are not credible unless conducted by a completely independent World Anti-Doping Agency, provided that its president has either a very strong aversion to doping or a wage contract that incites him or her to implement the announced level of effort.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:90-96

DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003001006

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