The Effectiveness of Incentive Mechanisms in Major League Baseball

Joel Maxcy (), Rodney D. Fort and Anthony C. Krautmann
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Rodney D. Fort: Washington State University
Anthony C. Krautmann: DePaul University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2002, vol. 3, issue 3, 246-255

Abstract: Past work on principal-agent problems in sports does not effectively compare among players. The comparison must be made between players nearing contract negotiations and other players to detect ex ante strategic behavior (turning up performance just prior to contract negotiations) and ex post shirking (slacking off after signing the contract). The authors’ productivity measures include statistics reflecting both the player’s desire (or availability) to play as well as his performance once he enters a game. The data reject strategic performance. This suggests that mechanisms aimed at curbing strategic performance by players appear to be working well. However, pitchers with nagging injuries may be more likely to be placed on the disabled list while under long-term contracts. This may imply strategic behavior or, conversely, that clubs are choosing to protect an investment. A performance measure used to test for shirking affects some results but not the ultimate conclusions.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:246-255

DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003003002

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