Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game

Stefan Szymanski

Journal of Sports Economics, 2004, vol. 5, issue 2, 111-126

Abstract: This article explores the standard 2-team model of talent choice in a professional sports league and argues that the application of Nash concepts leads to a different equilibrium than that which is normally identified. In particular, it is shown that the invariance principle for gate-revenue sharing no longer holds. Because the standard model, which is here called the Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, is widely taught in sports management and economics programs, these finding have important implications for teachers as well as researchers.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:111-126

DOI: 10.1177/1527002503261485

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