Overtime! Rules and Incentives in the National Hockey League

Stephen Easton and Duane Rockerbie

Journal of Sports Economics, 2005, vol. 6, issue 2, 178-202

Abstract: We construct a simple 2-period game model to determine the effects of recent National Hockey League rule changes on team incentives to win. The effects differ depending on the relative quality of the contestants and whether the contestants compete in the same conference. The model predicts that the average number of points during a season will rise, yet the average point differential among clubs within the same conference will fall. The model also predicts that the expected value of points per contest will be higher when playing nonconference opponents but lower when playing conference opponents. Because only a small percentage of contests are nonconference, we predict that more effort will be devoted to conference contests, particularly by lesser-talented clubs. The result is more competitive and exciting conference games requiring fewer overtime periods and potential ties. Empirical data support these hypotheses.

Keywords: revenue sharing; sports league; talent conjectures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:178-202

DOI: 10.1177/1527002504264424

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