Rematches in Boxing and Other Sporting Events

J. Atsu Amegashie and Edward Kutsoati
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Edward Kutsoati: Tufts University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2005, vol. 6, issue 4, 401-411

Abstract: The authors study the incentive effects of rematches in sports with an emphasis on professional boxing. If the difference between the boxers’ abilities is sufficiently small, the authors find that a clause that stipulates that the winner of the fight is obliged to give the loser a rematch (i.e., a mandatory rematch clause) results in a higher aggregate effort compared to aggregate effort when the probability of a rematch depends on effort. This result sheds some light on the practice of offering mandatory rematch clauses to elite boxers. The authors also argue that their results apply to rivalries and rematches in other sporting events and contests.

Keywords: boxing; contests; current effort; mandatory rematch clause; probability of rematch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:6:y:2005:i:4:p:401-411

DOI: 10.1177/1527002504268903

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