Corruption in College Basketball? Evidence of Tanking in Postseason Conference Tournaments

Ed Balsdon, Lesley Fong and Mark A. Thayer
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Ed Balsdon: San Diego State University
Lesley Fong: San Diego State University
Mark A. Thayer: San Diego State University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 1, 19-38

Abstract: This article observes that regular-season champions in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) men’s basketball often perform poorly in season-ending conference tournaments and examines two alternative explanations for this underperformance. We employ data on regular-season champions during the period 1990-2004 to test between competing models of “tanking†motivated by (a) fitness saving for the NCAA tournament and (b) a form of corruption. Our empirical results confirm that systematic under-performance does occur and indicate that corruption is a likely motivation.

Keywords: NCAA; basketball; tournament theory; fitness saving; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:19-38

DOI: 10.1177/1527002505275095

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