Penalty Kicks in Soccer

German Coloma ()

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 5, 530-545

Abstract: This article uses the model proposed by Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose to test for mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game between a kicker and a goalkeeper in the situation of a penalty kick in soccer. The main contribution of this article is to develop an alternative testing methodology on the basis of the use of a simultaneous-equation regression approach that directly tests the equilibrium conditions. Using the same data as Chiappori et al., the author finds results similar to theirs and also separately analyzes the behavior of different types of players (classified according to which foot they use to kick the ball and to the strategies they choose to mix).

Keywords: soccer penalty kicks; mixed strategies; Nash equilibrium; simultaneous-equation regression; Wald test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:5:p:530-545

DOI: 10.1177/1527002506289648

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