The Incentive Effects of Overtime Rules in Professional Hockey

Neil Longley and Swaminathan Sankaran
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Neil Longley: University of Massachusetts-Amherst
Swaminathan Sankaran: University of Regina, Saskatchewan

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 5, 546-554

Abstract: This article analyzes the incentive effects of the National Hockey League's overtime-loss rule by offering an alternative theoretical framework to that of Abrevaya, whose article recently appeared in this journal. Although his theoretical model implied that all teams would find it beneficial to adopt defensive strategies during the late stages of regulation time of a tied game, the model used in this article shows that there are situations where teams will forego such defensive strategies and continue to play offensively aggressive. In particular, the authors show that this decision as to which on-ice strategy to adopt depends crucially on a team's perception of its own on-ice strength, relative to that of its opponent. Using this behavioral model also allows the authors to analyze and compare the incentive effects of a wide range of alternative payoff structures, including the structure currently used in European soccer.

Keywords: NHL; overtime; incentives; ties; payoff; soccer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:5:p:546-554

DOI: 10.1177/1527002506294938

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